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IN FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS DERRICK BELL’S
INTEREST CONVERGENCE THEORY IS ON A COLLISION COURSE
WITH THE VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY RATIONALE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION
L. Darnell Weeden⃰
INTRODUCTION
Professor Derrick Bell is necessarily and properly acknowledged because
of his leading community service as a civil rights lawyer, a scholarly
intellectual, law professor, and political activist.1 Professor Derrick Bell
helped to set in place the basis for Critical Race Theory.2 After Professor Bell
became a member of the faculty of Harvard Law School in 1969, he shared
his experience and reflections regarding the civil rights movement and issues
of racial inequality with the academic community in a very profound and
prolific manner.3 “Because of his views about the permanence of racism and
the intransigence of inequality generally, Professor Bell and critical race
theorists have mistakenly been considered to be pessimists.”4 While
establishing an outstanding legal legacy, “Professor Bell worked to connect
law, scholarship, and the struggle for social justice, an endeavor that critical
race theorists also adopted and continue to further today.”5 One commentator
has described the late Professor Derrick Bell as the “founder of the Critical
Race Theory movement.”6 Over the course of my career, I have met and
talked with Professor Bell more than once, and I will describe him as an
intellectual giant committed to both racial equality and social justice.
Although I have great respect for Professor Bell as a courageous man of
principle, I nevertheless believe Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory
in the context of diversity in higher education merits reconsideration by
others.

⃰

Professor, Thurgood Marshall School Of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D.,
University of Mississippi. I extend a special word of thanks to my wife and children for
their endurance while I completed this article.
1
See Derrick Bell Official Site, http://professorderrickbell.com/ (last visited February
9, 2015).
2
Id.
3
See Derrick Bell Official Site, http://professorderrickbell.com/scholarship/ (last
visited February 9, 2015).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Elvia R. Arriola, It's Not Over: Empowering The Different Voice In Legal Academia,
29 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 320, 325 (2014).
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Under the Equal Protection principle, a public university’s admission
policy which makes race a significant factor in order to advance racial
diversity for an underrepresented racial minority violates the equal protection
rights of a nonminority. This is due to the fundamental right to be free of
racial discrimination in higher education, and therefore is not limited to
insular and discrete minorities.7 Two major cases that demonstrate this
concept are Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger.8 In Gratz, the
Supreme Court concluded that a University of Michigan undergraduate
admission policy that mechanically awarded twenty percent of the points
necessary to virtually assure admission of each underrepresented minority
applicant based exclusively on the applicant‘s race was an unconstitutional
violation of the equal protection of the law. Conversely, in Grutter v.
Bollinger,9 the Supreme Court held that law school student body diversity at
the University of Michigan is a compelling state interest that justifies the use
of race as one of many factors in a public university admissions under the
equal protection of the law concept.
Professor Derrick Bell contends that the Supreme Court’s 5-4
approval of Michigan’s Law School’s diversity admission program in Grutter
is a major case in point demonstrating how his interest convergence theory
works.10 The interest convergence theory, promoted by the late Professor
Derrick A. Bell without giving any deference to context, unrealistically
contends that the interest of African Americans in seeking racial equality is
supported only if policy makers determine that the interest of African
Americans converges with a greater political and economic interest of whites
in America.11 Simply stated, the white/majority will promote racial advances
for a racial minority only when it also promotes perceived white self-interest.
Under Professor Bell’s narrow treatment of the interest convergence theory
racial justice for racial minorities is an incidental by product of white selfinterest.
This article is divided into three parts. Part I examines Professor Bell’s
narrow, non-collaborative, treatment of interest convergence. Part II
contends that Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory has evolved to a
collaborative substantial beneficiary move toward freedom for historically
subordinated racial or ethnic groups. Part III presents an analysis of the
Fisher v. University of Texas12 with its implications for the collaborative
7

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
9
Id.
10
Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distraction, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1626 (2003).
11
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education,49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2005).
12
Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
8
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interest convergence theory and viewpoint diversity as constitutionally
permissible public policy. In Fisher13 the Supreme Court refused to
invalidate the use of race preference in admission at the University of Texas
at Austin (UT) but remanded the case in order to decide whether the UT
diversity plan was narrowly tailored to meet the goal of viewpoint diversity.
Fisher is a direct challenge to the interest convergence theory, that
historically subordinated racial groups will only receive a substantial
viewpoint diversity benefit in the admission process at UT if the policy
primarily promotes white self-interest.
I.

THE EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR BELL’S NARROW,
NON-COLLABORATIVE TREATMENT OF INTEREST
CONVERGENCE.

Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory is highly respected in the
legal academy and elsewhere.14 Even if it contains words of wisdom,
Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory should not escape reasonable
critique.15 Professor Driver, a legal scholar, appropriately asserts that “a
critical discussion” of Professor Bell’s interest-convergence theory is both
necessary, proper, and “is long overdue.”16 A potential adverse impact of
Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory, if left unchallenged, is that it
may unnecessarily “strengthens the racially conspiratorial viewpoint that is
disturbingly prevalent in the black community.”17 If Professor Bell’s view of
interest convergence represents a racial conspiratorial viewpoint, it runs the
great risk of alienating the many supporters of diversity in higher education
of many races. Professor Bell recognized that many in America including
Justice O’Connor, corporate America, and the nation’s military officials,
argue that viewpoint diversity is needed today in the global market place to
help students develop the intellectual skills necessary to engage in an
assortment of people, cultures, accepted wisdom, and perspectives.18 In spite
of Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory conceivable pragmatic flaws
it deserves examination due to its “considerable contribution to legal
discourse.”19

13

Id.
Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 149,
156 (2011).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 156-57.
18
Bell, Diversity’s Distraction, supra note 10 at 1623 (Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct.
2325, 2340 (2003).
19
Driver, Rethinking the Interest Convergence Thesis, supra note 14 at 157.
14
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PROFESSOR BELL’S INTEREST CONVERGENCE
THEORY HAS EVOLVED TO A COLLABORATIVE
SUBSTANTIAL BENEFICIARY MOVE TOWARD
FREEDOM FOR HISTORICALLY SUBORDINATED
RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUPS.

A collaborative application of Professor Bell’s interest convergence
theory supports the belief of equality, justice, and fair opportunity with
everyone sitting down at the table of brotherhood as racial equals. The
collaborative beneficiaries approach to viewpoint diversity permits an
inference that collaborative interest convergence is a necessary and proper
step for America to evolve into a more just and racially equal society. Since
the twin goals of social justice and racial equality promote the general welfare
of all people living in America, collaborative interest convergence is good
public policy. Professor Bell’s argument that interest convergence in the
context of race and the law in America is always a one sided venture on
balance is probably not valid from either a historical perspective or a
contemporary perspective because racial justice in America as a general rule
involves a collaboration of interests.
The Emancipation Proclamation20, well known for advancing freedom for
many black slaves, is a historic example of the interest convergence theory
necessarily and properly serving a compelling interest of blacks to be free
while advancing a substantial interest of whites in abolishing slavery. Now,
“the Proclamation is best understood as a legal document, albeit one
promulgated under unusual circumstances. Lincoln wrote the Emancipation
Proclamation believing, or fearing, that it might be litigated or challenged in
the Supreme Court.”21 When the Civil War began in the summer of 1862,
thousands of slaves abandoned “southern plantations to Union lines, and the
federal government didn’t have a clear policy on how to deal with them.
Emancipation would undermine the Confederacy while providing the Union
with a way to enlist thousands of former slaves.” 22 An expansive reading of
Bell’s interest convergence theory, as a tool of collaboration, supports my
conclusion that both the U.S. military and the newly emancipated slaves were
substantial beneficiaries of an emancipation proclamation that may have been
inspired by military strategy.23 It would deny social justice and military
20

Paul Finkelman, Lincoln, Emancipation, And The Limits Of Constitutional Change,
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 349 (2008) (citing Proclamation No 17, 12 STAT 1268 (Jan 1, 1863)).
21
Id.
22
Sarah Pruitt, Five Things You May Not Know About Lincoln, Slavery, and
Emancipation, HISTORY IN THE HEADLINES (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.history.com/news/5-things-you-may-not-know-about-lincoln-slavery-andemancipation.
23
Id.
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reality to suggest that newly freed black slaves were only incidental
beneficiaries of the Emancipation Proclamation even if it was adopted
predominately for military reasons.
The historical importance of the Emancipation Proclamation suggests
that Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory as a general rule should be
viewed under a primary effects test. This is seen when Bell applies his interest
convergence theory very narrowly to justify his position that Brown v. Board
of Education24 only held that racially separate public schools were
unconstitutional because the primary beneficiaries were whites.25 A
challenge to racially segregated public school was not a revolutionary idea
because people rejected segregation in the public schools since the 1840’s26
without success.27 It was during the 1840’s that the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts held that it was permissible under state law for the city of
Boston to establish separate but equal public schools for African American
schoolchildren. Even if the exclusive motive of the Supreme Court and the
federal executive branch in Brown in seeking to end public school
segregation was to achieve a strategic military or propaganda victory in the
Cold War was intended to benefit whites only, Bell’s narrow interest
convergence theory does not apply here because African Americans were
more than mere incidental beneficiary of the end of state sponsored racial
segregation. Even when interest convergence is intended to benefit the white
majority it is not to be regarded as an inherently negative situation if the
primary effect of a focus on the white middle class public policy actually
substantially advances the anti-subordination goal of African American in
ending legally required racial segregation in public schools and elsewhere.
It is conceded in the Brown decision that prohibiting racial segregation may
have granted to the United States a symbolic victory in the Cold War with
communist nations.28 However, the practical effect of the Brown antisegregation policy served as a collaborative foundation for ending state
imposed racial segregation in public places. 29
Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory is not limited to the issue of
race and the law. Under Professor Bell’s characterization of the role of
interest convergence, it could be argued that interest convergence is
nominally implicated whenever the primary purpose of any governmental
policy is to advance the agenda of the white middle class. Interest
24

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education,49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2005).
26
Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass 198 (Mass. 1849).
27
Bell, supra note 26.
28
Id. at 1056.
29
Id.
25
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convergence motivated by a focus on what is good for the white middle class,
which has the actual effect of substantially advancing social justice and racial
equality historically sought by subordinated groups, and their collaborators
should be embraced and not considered as inherently evil. Some scholars
believe that the narrow self-interest convergence theory is implicated in series
of issues including animal rights and the war on terror.30 Scholars have
utilized the narrow self-interest interest convergence theory to help explain
why the separation of church and state concept typically provides only
minimal benefits to groups underrepresented in the political process.31 Often
under represented, religious groups benefit only when their interest happened
to converge or correspond with the interest of an influential religious group.32
Under the narrow view of the interest convergence theory, the primary benefit
of separation of church and state accrues to Christianity as a recognized
leading religion in America.33.
Furthermore, with respect to workplace diversity, the narrow self-interest
convergence view holds that the government will require employers to hire
nonwhites only when doing so converges with the institutional interests of
the employer.34 It is alleged that when hiring, racial diversity is pursued
when the employer seeks institutional legitimacy while accommodating the
preferences of a historically racially homogeneous workplace environment.35
In some instances an employer may reasonably conclude that a racially
homogenous American work force may make it less profitable in the global
or local market place. An employer may also allege that work force diversity
serves a compelling interest because it has no other effective way to remain
competitive in a global marketplace. By analogy supporters of educational
diversity in the field of higher education may reasonably contend that
academic freedom supports intellectual diversity as a compelling interest.
Under the rationale of Grutter v. Bollinger,36 intellectual diversity is narrowly
tailored because it is a very effective way to teach students as future leaders
in business and government, as well as employees and employers, how to
compete in an international market place of ideas while minimizing domestic
unrest and international armed conflict.
Professor Bell’s narrow scope of the interest convergence theory is
extremely controversial in the context of advancing diversity in higher
30

Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest Convergence Thesis, supra note 18 at 155.
Id.
32
Id.
33
See Stephan M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 871–72 (1996).
34
See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1764 (2003).
35
Id.
36
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
31
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education because of the nature of the benefit sought. Since the benefit of
racial diversity in higher education is recognized constitutionally as a
compelling shared goal of blacks, other racial minorities, and whites;
Professor Bell’s narrow view of interest convergence is so problematic that
it invites discussion. When important shared goals of whites and other racial
minorities including blacks converge in the fight for the benefits of
intellectual diversity in higher education, a more expansive collaborative
view of interest convergence is required than the one articulated by Professor
Bell.
Under a collaborative view of the interest convergence theory, it is
important to discuss whether a convergence of interest between historically
subordinate racial minorities and the white power structure actually has the
effect of advancing a compelling or important educational diversity goal
sought by blacks and other racial minorities. Since blacks and other
traditionally underrepresented minorities groups have aggressively sought to
protect the alleged benefit of viewpoint diversity in higher education, it would
lack congruence to conclude to that the awarding of diversity in higher
education is experienced by blacks as only an incidental benefit. A
predominantly white university developing or asserting a true interest in
intellectual diversity as a tool of academic freedom provides a welcomed
opportunity to discuss issues related to law and equality. Intellectual
diversity, even if inspired primarily by an academic freedom movement
which collaboratively converges with a longstanding black goal of achieving
racial diversity in higher education, does not render the black racial diversity
goal as an inherently inferior and incidental factor.
The diversity rationale for affirmative action is unnecessarily
creatively complex because it allegedly does not compensate beneficiaries
for past racial discrimination experienced in society.37 Nevertheless, William
G. Bowen and Derek Bok in The Shape of the River conclusion regarding the
benefits generated by expanding diversity in American colleges and
universities, has a practical individual compensatory effect for a beneficiary
of affirmative action where race is a factor in the admission process.38
Diversity black male graduates careers are greatly enhanced because race
conscious inspired affirmative action provided them with an opportunity to
graduate from prestigious colleges and universities. This will allow them to
generally earn double the amount of money earned by black males with
Bachelor of Arts degrees from less prestigious colleges during a similar

37

Tung Yin, Is “Diversity” Diverse Enough? 21 ASIAN AM. L.J. 89, 93 (2014).
Id. At 94 (Citing William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape Of The River: LongTerm Consequences Of Considering Race In College And University Admissions 281-82
(1998).
38
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twenty year period.39 Secondly, Bowen and Bok contend the race conscious
affirmative action which enhanced the career results for these black male
graduates also benefitted society because diversity graduates from
prestigious colleges are more likely than their similarly situated white peers
to assume leadership roles in civic and community groups.40 Some supporters
of intellectual diversity with a race factor think communities of color will
benefit since the ethnic or racial minority diversity affirmative action
graduates is more likely than others to serve communities of color as doctors,
lawyers, and as professionals in the global market place.41 Finally, Bowen
and Bok conclude that a racial diverse student body at the college level
benefits non-minority students, because race matters and white students need
at a minimum academic classroom realization of the attitudes, views, and
circumstances confronting most racial minorities.42
Professor Bell’s white self-interest diversity theory is very
problematic for Twenty First Century universities seeking to promote either
viewpoint or racial diversity. From a historical perspective it has been
assumed by one commentator that the “Interest- Convergence principally
contemplates what will be, rather than what has been.”43 Professor Bell’s
racial justice Prophet Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois was too pragmatic to reject
diversity because it might have been motivated primarily by white selfinterest if the goal of achieving racial equality for blacks was actually
advanced.44 In the field of higher education it is very plausible that Dr. Du
Bois would accept a viewpoint diversity plan that created a more diverse
collaborative education for all college students.45
Since Dr. Du Bois was a pragmatic intellectual he would support a
college diversity plan that provided students of color with a wider networking
opportunity in their future.46 One of the benefits of viewpoint diversity for all
college students is that it may stimulate mutual respect for all races while
serving as a deterrence to future acts of racism. A progressive collaborative
view of the interest convergence in the context of higher education and

39

Id.
Id. at 94-95 (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 38, at 258).
41
Id. at 95 (citing See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Minority Preferences in Law School
Admissions, in Constitutional Government In America 277, 282–83 (1980)).
42
Id. (citing Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political
Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 686 (1975)).
43
Driver, Rethinking the Interest Convergence Thesis, supra note 14 at 149.
44
Derrick Bell, Racism As The Ultimate Deception, 86 N.C.L.REV. 621, 629 (2007–
2008).
45
See id. (citing W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools? 4
J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335 (1935)).
46
See id.
40
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diversity may recognize the color-line as a continuing major problem47 but
offer viewpoint diversity as a tool to help promote racial and cross cultural
understanding to address issues of racial and economic inequality. One of the
major functions of viewpoint diversity under the rationale of Grutter v.
Bollinger 48 is to advance a multicultural understanding in an increasingly
diverse workforce and society. Supporter of diversity in higher education
may agree with the declaration made by the singer Ray Charles that
“understanding is the best thing in the world.”49
Since the battle to achieve viewpoint diversity in higher education
represents shared goals in the political process promoted by white, blacks,
and other racial minorities in achieving racial justice, it is unfair to treat
interest convergence as an exclusive tool of white self-interest.50 Professor
Bell plausibly suggests that once interest convergence moves beyond the
judicial process, interest convergence has the potential to develop into a
valuable collaborative blueprint.51 Professor Bell suggests that defenders of
the University of Michigan’s diversity plan implemented the interest
convergence theory to serve the University’s white self-interest perhaps at
the request and expense of its black supporters.52 While connecting the
University of Michigan Law School diversity approach to his interest
convergence theory Professor Bell said, “Using the interest convergence
model in planning and implementing civil rights strategies may mean relying
less on courts to advance racial goals. But, as individuals and groups, we have
to challenge the assumptions of white dominance and the presumption of
black incompetence.”53 A collaborative approach to interest convergence
based on racial equality and respect for the individual inherently rejects the
assumption of white superiority.
The irony of Professor Bell’s traditional interest convergence theory
in the higher education diversity battle is that it is hard to support the white
self-interest theory as the exclusive justification for viewpoint diversity when
the diversity program has the potential of denying a white applicant’s
admission to either the highly respected university of Michigan Law School
or the greatly regarded University of Texas undergraduate school. I believe it
is appropriate to contend that UT is dedicated to keeping its diversity goals
alive because it reasonably believes that the best interest of all members of
47

Id. (citing W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, The Souls of Black Folk 23 (1903)).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
49
Bell, Racism as the Ultimate Deception, supra note 44 (citing Ray Charles,
Understanding, on PORTRAIT OF RAY (ABC Records 1968)).
50
Contra, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons In Brown v. Board of
Education, N.YL. Sch. L. Rev. 1053, 1066, (2004–2005).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
48
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society is best served by the benefits of viewpoint diversity.
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS FOR THE COLLABORATIVE INTEREST
CONVERGENCE THEORY AND THE VIEWPOINT
DIVERSITY DEBATE

UT takes into account race as one of a number of elements in its
undergraduate admissions practice.54 Race is not given a mathematical
assessment for every single candidate, nevertheless the University has
devoted resources to expanding racial minority registration on campus. UT
identifies its objective as achieving a critical mass of minority students. In
Fisher v. University of Texas, a Caucasian plaintiff, sued the University after
her submission was denied. She claims that the University's treatment of race
in its admission practice is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The parties requested the Court to decide whether
the judgment of the lower courts below properly applied the Supreme Court's
decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment under the rationale of Grutter v. Bollinger.55 The Court held that
because the Court of Appeals fail to hold the University to the demanding
burden of strict scrutiny established in Grutter, its ruling affirming the
District Court's award of summary judgment to the University was improper.
That verdict was vacated, and the case was remanded for additional
proceedings.56
After the Court's decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger, and Gratz v.
Bollinger, UT implemented, the 2004 program in which the University
utilized an explicit consideration of race. The 2004 program was challenged
in Fisher.57 In Grutter, the Court approved the use of race as one of many
“plus factors” in the admissions process that measured the complete
individual impact of each candidate.58 In Gratz, by comparison, the Court
concluded Michigan's undergraduate registration process was an
unconstitutional admissions program, because it mechanically gave points to
candidates from specific racial groups.59 UT’s plan to implement raceconscious admissions was announced in a June 2004 document called
Proposal to Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions (Proposal).60 The
54

Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 2416.
58
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
59
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 204 (2003).
60
Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2416 (2013).
55
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Proposal determined that the University did not have a “critical mass” of
minority students, and that in order to cure the shortage it was essential to use
race as an explicit factor in the undergraduate admissions process. To execute
the Proposal UT included a student's race as a factor in the (Personal
Achivement Index) PAI score, starting with candidates in the fall of 2004.
The University requests students to categorize themselves from among five
predefined racial groups on the application.61 While race is not assigned a
direct numerical value it is acknowledged that race is a significant or
important factor in the admission process.62
A racial classification by a public university must meet a strict
scrutiny standard because decisions considering race must be narrowly
tailored to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.63 A compelling
interest that might justify a utilization of race is the educational advantages
that are naturally generated by a diverse student body.64 Remedying historical
discrimination is not a compelling interest, since it is incompatible with a
university's expansive undertaking in the enterprise of education.65 Unlike a
university, the Supreme Court contends, the judicial, legislative, or
administrative governmental entities have the necessary expertise and
resources to determine whether racial classification is needed to remedy past
societal discrimination.66
A diverse student body is intended to promote independent
viewpoints in spite of a race conscious admission procedure.67 It is
reasonable to foresee that a university’s viewpoint diversity goals will
promote inclusive classroom dialogue when a critical mass of students with
nontraditional backgrounds do not experience unreasonable racial or social
isolation.68 A primary effect of expanding a university’s goal in developing
diversity is the lessening of social economic status isolation and other status
stereotypes.69 The educational operation of a university is granted an
important degree of deference under the First Amendment. Because a
university is a creative intellectual enterprise its determination about ‘who
may be admitted to study” should be given a great deal of deference.70 Justice
Powell's characterization of the benefits of university level diversity as a
61

Id.
Id.
63
Id. At 2417.
64
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305, 307-309 (1978)
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. at 2418 (2013).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in judgment).
62
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complex permissible goal is very accurate. According to Justice Powell
viewpoint diversity is not limited to unsophisticated attempts at racial
diversity, in which a quantified percentage of the student body is promised to
designated racial groups.71 A diversity goal which promotes a compelling
state interest involves a more extensive grouping of experiences than racial
or ethnic origin.72
The recent educational diversity opinion in Fisher v. University of
Texas requires universities to articulate a compelling rationale to justify their
viewpoint diversity goals.73 For example, a university as an academic
institution could contend that the benefits of viewpoint diversity are
compelling because like free speech intellectual diversity serves the societal
value of promoting the search for knowledge and truth in the market place of
ideas while promoting individual fulfilment on issues of race and social
justice.74 When free speech and intellectual diversity goals are treated as
compelling academic endeavors enhanced by First Amendment free speech
and freedom of association considerations a university’s diversity procedure
is less likely to remind a court of a racial quota.
According to certain commentators, Fisher is very noteworthy
because of what it did not do rather than for what it actually did.75 The Court
refused to invalidate UT's holistic admissions program, and rejected the
temptation to overrule Grutter and it did not officially, modify the
constitutional benchmarks declared in Grutter, did not rule that UT's
admissions procedure flunked the narrowly tailoring test, took no steps
indicate shortcomings in the UT diversity plan.76 One popular interpretation
of Fisher by the supporters of diversity, is that it did not create any new law,
but was a simply black letter restatement of Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz v.
Bollinger. “Upon a closer reading, Fisher is a departure from settled law in a
number of critical respects.”77 The Supreme Court's decision in Fisher
pretends that it is simply instructing the Fifth Circuit that its utilization of the
law invented in Grutter was wrong.78 In spite of this assertion, the Court's
unforeseen judgment abandons the standard approved in Grutter while
inventing a different legal standard.79 Some scholars contend the greatest
71

Id.
Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 separate opinion).
73
Tung Yin, Is “Diversity” Diverse Enough? supra note 37 at 38.
74
See Emerson, The System Freedom of Expression (1970).
75
John A. Powell, Stephen Menendian, Fisher V. Texas: The Limits of Exhaustion And
The Future Of Race-Conscious University Admissions, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 903
(2014).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 904.
78
Id. at 905.
79
Id.
72
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problem with Fisher is that the Court's strong suggestion that a public
university must run through all practical race-neutral options in order to
justify the educational diversity benefit under the narrowly tailoring strict
scrutiny test articulated in Grutter.80 Justice Kennedy's statement in Fisher
that all practical race-neutral options be given serious deliberation in order to
meet the strict scrutiny test invented in Grutter, symbolizes a problematic
retreat from Grutter.81 Fisher looks as if it has substituted Grutter's demand
of a good faith deliberation of race-neutral opportunities with the additional
demand that all practical race neutral options be given serious
consideration.82 It is alleged that the Fisher opinion places Grutter’s
educational benefits of diversity rationale at risk because “the Court shifts
responsibility for assessing the viability of workable race-neutral alternatives
from the university to the courts.”83 In Grutter, when the University of
Michigan alleged that it was using race as a single factor among many other
factors to promote the educational benefits of diversity, the Court allowed the
university to survive the narrow tailoring test. The Court presumed the
university was acting in “good faith” in evaluating the lack of practical race
neutral options to achieve its academic mission.84
On remand in Fisher v. University of Texas85 the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter mandates the
application of strict scrutiny as to UT’s diversity admissions procedure
because it utilized race as a factor. After discussing Justice Kennedy's dissent
in Grutter, the Supreme Court disapproved of both the federal district court's
and the Fifth Circuit’s judicial approval of the race conscious procedure
utilized by UT Austin to promote diversity because UT procedures did not
meet the narrowly tailored requirements needed to seek a diverse student
body. The Fifth Circuit’s charge on remand was to give exacting scrutiny to
UT’s diversity endeavors.86 On remand the Fifth Circuit took a less
deferential approach to UT’s diversity goals by applying a form of strict
scrutiny that Professor Vinay Harpalani has described as a “unique
contribution to diversity” requirement.87 According to Professor Harpalani,
the goal of the unique contribution to diversity requirement allows the court
to reasonably “assess the underlying issue raised by Fisher-whether a race
conscious policy is necessary to attain the educational benefits of diversity
80
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when a race-neutral policy is in place and has increased diversity.” 88 The
choice to chase the educational benefits created by student body diversity that
a University considers important to its undertaking is, for all practical purpose
an academic judgment to which a degree of academic freedom deference
from the judicial branch is appropriate under Grutter.89 Without trying to
decide whether a critical mass exists at UT the unique contribution to
diversity analysis converges on whether UT’s race-conscious admission
policy reasonably adds distinctively to the educational benefits of viewpoint
diversity expressed in Grutter.90
The deference to diversity rationale articulated by the Fifth Circuit on
remand indicates that Professor Bell interest convergence theory might be a
little insensitive to the old fashion art of horse trading.91 In my view
collaborative interest convergence is analogous to horse trading.
Collaborative interest convergence in the academic policy making framework
is similar to the legislative setting because both politicians and academicians
after reasonable opportunity to debate on an issue are comfortable
compromising to achieve their policy goals.92 The Fifth Circuit on remand
in Fisher may have allowed diversity to live because of its implicit judicial
appreciation of collaborative interest convergence as involving the art of
conciliation.93 It appears that the Fifth implicitly rejected Professor Bell’s
white self-interest convergence theory because it recognized that the UT
diversity plan represented a collaborative cooperation even though it was an
immediate burden to the white self-interest of those applicants who unlike
Fisher who might have been admitted to UT but for the race conscious
affirmative action plan.94 Under the rationale of both Grutter and Fisher a
court is required to confirm that a rationale principled explanation exists for
the academic decision to purse the benefits of diversity.95 Fisher notes that,
“Diversity is a composite of the backgrounds, experiences, achievements, and
hardships of students to which race only contributes.”96
In 1997, after the Hopwood v. Texas97 opinion in which the court
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determined that race could not be used as a factor in law school admissions,
UT confronted a difficult situation: realizing holistic diversity while
incorporating racial diversity which it deemed important to its academic
undertaking but not facially taking into account race as one of several factors
of diversity. Prohibited from utilizing race as a factor after Hopwood, UT
implemented the Top Ten Percent Plan, which provides Texas inhabitants
finishing in the top ten percent of their graduating high school class an option
to attend any public university in Texas.98 The Top Ten Percent process had
the ability to cover every freshman seat at UT, however, by itself it was not
an acceptable method of promoting the holistic diversity anticipated by
Bakke.99 The Top Ten Percent plan was flawed because it did not include
superior-performing, multi-talented students, minority or non-minority.100
Because it focused exclusively on class rank The Top Ten Percent Plan places
an undue burden on viewpoint diversity and academic integrity because it
excluded huge numbers of extremely qualified minority and non-minority
candidates.101 The problem with the Texas Top Texas Top Percent Plan was
addressed by the Court in Grutter, when it said “even assuming such plans
are race-neutral, they may preclude the university from conducting the
individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not
just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the
university.”102
The Fifth Circuit rejected Fisher’s contention that socioeconomic
disadvantage is an appropriate race-neutral alternative procedure under a
holistic review because race still matters even when it should not be relevant
at all.103 “Bakke accepts that skin color matters—it disadvantages and ought
not to be relevant but it is. We are ill-equipped to sort out race, class, and
socioeconomic structures, and Bakke did not undertake to do so.”104 After
refusing to “conclude that skin color is no longer an index of prejudice” the
Fifth Circuit upheld the UT diversity plan under the Supreme Court’s Fisher
strict scrutiny standard of no other practical option 105 rather than Fisher’s
unacceptable Fifth Circuit’s good faith strict scrutiny light approach.106
While meeting the demanding, narrow tailoring requirement under
the equal protection principle UT proved that a race-conscious holistic review
remained indispensable to the Top Ten Percent plan because it allows UT to
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support a facially-neutral process while seeking to enrich viewpoint diversity
as an academic undertaking.107 Grutter reiterated the belief that growing up
in a specific region, possessing certain professional encounters and the
unique experience of being a racial minority in an American society where
race still matters will probably impact a person’s viewpoint.108 The Fifth
Circuit was convinced on remand that to block UT’s requested narrow use of
race as a factor as it pursues holistic diversity, would unnecessarily impair
the richness of the educational involvement permitted under the basic
principles of Bakke and Grutter.109
The diversity skill sets created by admitting candidates from
majority-white and majority-minority schools supports the Supreme Court’s
decision in Fisher that evenhanded educational diversity is deeper than skin
color.110 “To conclude otherwise is to narrow its focus to a tally of skin colors
produced in defiance of Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court which
eschewed the narrow metric of numbers and turned the focus upon
individuals. This powerful charge does not deny the relevance of race.”111
The Fifth Circuit decided that because race still matters it may be utilized as
a single narrowly tailored compelling element to assist UT in its task of
admitting “students with a range of skills, experiences, and performances”
that promote viewpoint diversity on campus.112
Although many believe diversity produces significant benefits for
students, colleges as well as society, the viewpoint diversity rationale has
been subjected to major criticism.113 It has been accused of not actually
developing racial justice for students of color, but rather benefiting white
colleges by legitimizing admissions policies that support white privilege
while creating an atmosphere that cause in fighting among minority
groups.114 Because the Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz approved
diversity as a compelling state interest but nevertheless refused to recognize
the remediation of societal discrimination as also compelling Professor
Derrick Bell said an exclusive concentration on diversity permits courts as
well as policymakers to evade truths regarding past and continuing racial
discrimination.115 According to Professor Bell, rather than receive these selfevident truths as validation for a truly remedial interest in affirmative action
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that would assist racial minorities, policymakers advertise, and some courts
support, the viewpoint that diversity is a compelling interest primarily
because of diversity's advantage for Whites.116
Professor Bell’s interest convergence attack on the diversity rationale
is potentially self-destructive because it undermines the collaborative interest
convergence efforts among blacks and other minority groups since it
unreasonably presumes that whites are generally not capable of championing
social and racial justice without being preoccupied with white self-interest.
An interest convergence theory that places undue emphasis on the need to
protect white self interest in the viewpoint diversity debate is pragmatically
unacceptable to groups like African Americans, Mexican Americans, and
diversity friendly whites. Whites like members of other races may endorse
diversity, because they simply want to end the lack of viewpoint diversity at
institutions of higher education. Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory
promotes an outcome that “is antithetical to genuine social justice
movements, which should encourage”117 all groups to support one another in
order to create a better society even if means sacrificing their self- interest. I
believe that championing a race neutral diversity percentage plan has the
potential to be accepted under a collaborative interest convergence theory
because it will inspire larger and more operational viewpoint diversity than a
diversity plan that is explicitly race conscious.
When the United States Supreme Court in the Fisher v. University of
Texas opinion explained the Texas's Top Ten Percent Law as a race-neutral
process for realizing the viewpoint diversity, it engaged in collaborative
interest convergence in order to save the diversity goals articulated in its
Grutter decision.118 Collaborative interest convergence allowed the Supreme
Court in Fisher to judicially label the Texas Top Ten Percent as
presumptively valid race-neutral social legislation under the Equal Protection
Clause rational basis standard. This is due to the Texas plan’s conceivable
rational relationship with UT’s articulated academic enhancement viewpoint
diversity goal.119 Unlike a race-conscious percentage plan promoting
viewpoint diversity a race neutral plan does not have to meet the strict
scrutiny Equal Protection Clause diversity standard articulated in Grutter.120
The Supreme Court’s characterization of the Top Ten Percent Plan in
Fisher as race neutral in spite of Justice Ginsburg’s solo dissenting position
116
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that the plan is race conscious signals an implied judicially collaborative
interest convergence that represents a type of judicial consensus that may not
be available under a race-conscious percentage plan.121 A majority of the
Court now appears ready to support a race-neutral Texas percentage plan
under the rational basis standard which signals a collaborative interest
convergence and a continuing judicial acknowledgement that viewpoint
diversity among college students will probably increase the understanding
our society needs in order to bring a quicker end to racial and social isolation
that often leads to discrimination.122 Viewpoint diversity shows great
potential for social healing because in a civil society change “comes from a
confluence of personal, cultural, and legal transformation,”123
On June 29, 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition
for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in order to rehear the Fisher case.124 The family of Heman Marion Sweatt
who was not admitted to the University Of Texas Law School because he was
“a negro” has filed an up-to-date brief endorsing UT Austin's existing
admission's policies.125 Sweatt's family backs UT in its extended legal
encounter with Abigail Fisher, who maintains her 2008 denial of admission
by the state's flagship university was race based discrimination.126 The Fisher
case will be argued before the Supreme Court for the second time in
December of 2015 and has far-reaching implications regarding how
universities in America may treat race in the admissions process.127 “The
Sweatt family's brief, which is one of many to have been filed ahead of
December's oral arguments, says that UT considers race the right way: as only
one factor.”128 However, according to the brief filed with the Supreme Court
by Fisher's lawyers’, "By holding that UT discriminated against
Ms. Fisher and reversing the judgment below, the Court will not only
vindicate her equal-protection rights, it will remind universities that the use
of race in admissions must be a last resort -- not the rule”129
CONCLUSION
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This article has reasoned that Professor Bell’s interest convergence
theory in the context of viewpoint diversity in higher education is probably
too restrictive because it implies that judicial transformation in rejecting
racial discrimination is only inspired by white self-interest.130 If the interest
conversion theory represents the concept that blacks will only achieve an
educational diversity viewpoint benefit when it serves exclusively white selfinterest, it is not likely to receive any deference or recognition by the Court
in Fisher. However, Fisher suggests a race neutral percentage plan designed
to advance the viewpoint of diversity in Texas colleges, represents a legal and
cultural transformation that is consistent with the Confucianism concept of
respect for individual dignity.131 A college viewpoint diversity plan that does
not discriminate on the basis of race, is a feature of Confucianism has won
general acceptance in Texas. A race neutral viewpoint of the diversity
percentage plan, motivated by a collaborative interest convergence for the
twin purposes of immediate academic enhancement and long term
community progress, is a characteristic of Confucianism132 which was
implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in Fisher.133
Professor Bell’s interest convergence attack on the diversity rationale
is potentially self-destructive because it undermines the collaborative interest
convergence efforts among blacks and minority groups since it unreasonably
presumes that whites are generally not capable of championing social and
racial justice without being preoccupied with white self-interest. An interest
convergence theory that places undue emphasis on the need to protect white
self interest in the viewpoint diversity debate is pragmatically unacceptable
to groups such as African Americans, Mexican Americans, and diversity
friendly whites. Whites like members of other races may endorse diversity,
because they simply want to end the lack of viewpoint diversity at institutions
of higher education. Although Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory
may have intellectual appeal, it may unfairly discredit the goals of those who
truly believe that a society benefits from intellectual diversity.
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